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This master's thesis examines how the degree of risk influences the cooperative behavior of 
individuals to understand how cooperation can be better organized. Explicitly, the individual risk 
preference as compared to the risk level of the environment in which individuals make their decisions. 
The effect of a social frame on the classical representation of economic games is investigated 
experimentally. In general, the understanding and identification of critical success factors enable to 
indicate the cooperation behavior of individuals, but organizations also benefit from the indicated 
components that require cooperation. Cooperation’s are associated with a high level of risk and 
pressure. Therefore, it is necessary to carefully study the environmental conditions to get the best 
result. The aim of this study is to characterize the optimal conditions for the evolution of cooperation 
and its critical success factors to ensure the success of cooperation and to guarantee operational 
excellence of the entire process.  
This master's thesis is based on an experimental study that collects facts and evidence from different 
perspectives. This experimental study helps to understand the motives behind cooperation in the Stag-
hunt games by comparing different economic gams and two risk preferences elicitation methods with 
those Stag-hunt games of this study. The Trust game, Ultimatum game, Dictator game, as well as the 
Holt and Laury price list and the Bomb risk elicitation task, are compared to the Stag-hunt games. 
Payoffs are manipulated in a two-player one-shot Stag-hunt game. The Payoffs explain the degree of 
cooperation by combining three motives: Baseline, more efficient, and less risk. In addition, the social 
framing effect is investigated as a treatment in the experiment. This is implemented as a joint venture 
scenario. This study helps organizations to better understand how to develop strategies that protect 
against failure of cooperation. Decision-makers can use the results of this research to carry out 
cooperation’s from planning, through implementation, to a successful conclusion. 
On the one hand, payoff dominance and risk dominance are not significant. However, in the game 
less risk there is a positive influence on the likelihood of cooperation. On the other hand, the treatment 
business setting is strongly significant which means that cooperation occurs more often in the joint 
venture scenario than in the classical representation of the economic games. It positively influences 
cooperation behavior. This appears to be why previous attempts to explain Stag-hunt games' decisions 
only with risk attitudes have not been successful. In this study, trust does not significantly influence. 
However, it could be demonstrated that it is a basic requirement for cooperation. 
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The growing importance of cooperative relationships can be observed with increasing frequency. The 
vast majority of such relationships are in the form of collaboration. In the present master’s thesis, 
cooperation in the form of a joint venture is examined. Explicitly, a game-theoretical analysis is used 
to investigate whether there is a difference in the investigation of cooperation behavior through 
standard economic games and these games if a social frame is given. The investigation is expanded 
to include the analysis of equilibrium selection (Harsanyi & Selten, 1988). The selection criteria of 
payoff and risk dominance are determined. Specifically, a different part of this study is that 
individuals tend to cooperate more, which can maximize their own and collective profits, or if self-
interest dominates and cooperation is rejected due to an increased degree of risk. However, there is 
the simultaneous existence of cooperation and competition between competitors. These relationships 
are not necessarily associated with the advantages of these collaborations; collaborations also harbor 
dangers. For example, the advantages that result from the cooperation are the stimulation of 
innovations by partners, the development of new technologies, the procurement of additional 
resources, the entry into new markets, or the creation of new products and services. The disadvantages 
can be enormous when efforts to cooperate fail. 
 
Expressly, the master's thesis' primary focus is on the stumbling block of cooperation and the social 
contract theory. There are no societies and communities without social contracts. Every interpersonal 
cooperation represents a social contract. Most of the actors involved are not aware of these contracts, 
for example, when a parent asks his child to do the dishes. In business practice, this is mostly different; 
even if the supervisor asks something to be done, the concluded employment contract represents the 
social relationship between these two actors. Cooperation means risk; children trust in their parents' 
care, and employees trust that the work done will be rewarded at the end of the month. The risk of 
abuse of trust is one of the perspectives this study focuses on. Suppose there is only one-sided trust 
and the willingness to cooperate. In that case, this one-sided willingness to cooperate is doomed to 
failure, and the Trustor has to pay a high price for the trust he/she has raised. In other words, the 
Trustor goes away empty-handed, whereas the Trustee benefits despite the anti-social behavior.  
 
As in the example mentioned above, social contracts of all kinds depend on trust (Skyrms, 2008). If 
we look at trust through the lens of game theory, the representation is given by the Trust Game (Berg, 
Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). In this study, the TG is used in an extension of the classic form by the 
strategy method (Selten, 1967), making it possible to examine the participants' preferences more 
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closely. Trust is also elementary in another economic game, namely the Stag-hunt Game. In the SHG, 
the players are confronted with decisions related to risk and uncertainty, as in the TG. The difference 
is that the players do not make their decisions one after the other (Sequential Game), but preferably 
simultaneously, which is the particular interest of this study. A hitherto neglected question, especially 
in business administration and economics, is how risk and uncertainty contribute to pro-social 
behavior and the willingness to cooperate? 
 
On the one hand, people behave prosocial and selfless. On the other hand, they refrain from working 
with others and act selfishly. How can this contradicting behavior be explained? The center of interest 
is the evolution of cooperative behavior in humans in a business context. The research questions are 
answered through individuals contributing to the interaction with computer-aided economic games 
in an experimental study. These economic games come from game theory and make it possible to 
examine cooperation in various conflict situations. Therefore, the main emphasis is studying the 
interaction between environmental structures (i.e., payoffs and framing) and prosocial behavior 
concerning cooperation. In other words, a key aspect is how risky environments and social framing 
influence human behavior. 
 
When it comes to the risk assessment of cooperative action, Peter Singer is one of the most frequently 
cited persons. P. Singer (1972) has referred to international cooperation development and devised the 
following moral principle: 
 
"If it is our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything 
morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it." 
 
Risk in business administration and economics literature is usually defined in terms of the variance 
of possible monetary outcomes. Furthermore, risk-seeking is defined as a preference for a higher 
variance payoff, holding the expected value constant (Markowitz, 1952). The two economists Knight 
(1921) and (Keynes, 1921, 1937) differentiate between risk and uncertainty. In Risk, Uncertainty, 
and Profit, Knight (1921) defines uncertainties as a generic term for three types of probability 
situations: logically obtained (a priori) probabilities, empirically (statistically) ascertained 
probability, and estimated Probability (probability based on estimates and intuitive judgment). 
Therefore, the decision-maker knows the objective probability distribution over possible outcomes 
from a decision under uncertainty. This information is assessed with some degree of vagueness 
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(Knight, 1921). Apart from simple games of chance, one must make decisions with incomplete 
information of probability distribution of possible outcomes. Explicitly, the subjective expected 
utility (Savage, 1972) considers the uncertainty by replacing objective probabilities with subjective 
probabilities derived from decisions that are believed to agree with the standard axioms of probability 
theory.  
 
In contrast, when medical professionals and laypeople identify risky behaviors (e.g., drug use, 
unprotected sex, or mountain climbing), they refer to a broader meaning of the term. Medic usually 
defines risky behavior as behavior that can harm themselves or others (Schonberg, Fox, & Poldrack, 
2011). Interviews with senior managers suggest that they are more likely to see risk in terms of 
possible adverse outcomes than in terms of changes probabilities or some quantifiable construct 
(March & Shapira, 1987). 
 
Despite the evidence that suggests pro-social behavior is indispensable for a well-functioning society. 
To date, however, a reliable scientific assessment and understanding of the underlying structure 
remain a challenge (Tusche, Böckler, Kanske, Trautwein, & Singer, 2016). Various disciplines such 
as economics, psychology, neuroscience, and biology have addressed pro-social behavior and 
explored preconditions, limitations, and foundations of pro-social behavior (Batson, 2011; Boyd & 
Richerson, 2009; Fowler, 2005; J. Henrich et al., 2006; Martin A Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). 
However, the methodologies of the individual scientific disciplines are different and focus on various 
aspects of pro-socialism. 
  
Pro-social behavior is done for the sake of others rather than for the self. Therefore, this often entails 
risks or costs to oneself, such as providing resources to others, waiting in line, demanding or paying 
a fair price, or risking their lives in combat. Moreover, it is neither irrational nor self-destructive to 
carry out such acts (Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Bartels, 2007). In a nutshell, risk-
taking behavior brings potential negative consequences, which are somewhat offset by perceived 
positive impacts (Aklin, Lejuez, Zvolensky, Kahler, & Gwadz, 2005; Moore, Gullone, & Kostanski, 
1997). In particular, the Stag-hunt Game is considered. The efficiency and risk level varying the gains 
from cooperation by manipulating payoffs and the frame in which this occurs. Moreover, part of this 
study is the demonstration of the existence of the norm’s trust, fairness, reciprocity, and altruism with 
the help of the Trust Game, Ultimatum Game, and Dictator Game in the center of attention by 
comparing the standard economic game with this game in a social frame. Two risk preference 
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elicitation methods are consulted to examine the individual risk preferences and compare this with 
the cooperation behavior. 
 
This master's thesis consists of six chapters about how individuals protect themselves from risks 
through non-cooperative behavior or, in return, take the risk of cooperation to achieve even better 
results. The master´s thesis structure is as follows: Chapter two describes in a detailed literature 
review the background to this study's considerations and the research gap. Also, the precise objectives 
and limitations of the study are defined. Chapter three contains the theories and definitions relevant 
to this research. These are discussed in detail to pave the way for this research. Chapter four reports 
on the research methodology used. Thereby, the statistical methods used are briefly introduced. 
Chapter five deals with empirical research and the results are presented. The results are evaluated and 
connected to the research hypotheses. Chapter six is dedicated to the discussion in which the study is 




2 Literature review 
Adam Smith (1994/ original publication 1776) work An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations is believed to be one of the modern economics’ origins. The origin of game theory 
is not attributed to a single book. Still, The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Von Neumann 
& Morgenstern, 1944) can be counted as game theory's birth. Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
adopted the mathematician's research strategy to find a solution to the problem in its simplest form 
and then expand the solution step by step to more complex and possibly realistic cases. Game theory 
is used in severe interactions such as politics, business competition, and war. Note, Schelling (1958) 
and Robert Aumann (2003) received the Nobel Prize in 2005. Both suggested that game theory can 
be better understood as "interactive decision theory."  
 
Interactive decisions are those with only two decision-makers, i.e., two-person games. Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern further simplified these games. The consideration of two-person games in which 
everything won by one must be lost by the other is known as two-person zero-sum games. Von 
Neumann's and Morgenstern's solution to this most precise class of games that each person chooses 
the strategy that maximizes their minimum payoff (C. F. Camerer, 1991) is still recognized as the 
solution to this simple case. In a zero-sum game, however, there is no way for any potential of 
cooperation, as there is no possibility of a mutual win under the assumption. Nash (1951) revised von 
Neumann's and Morgenstern's (1944) solution in a form extended to non-constant sum games, i.e., 
interactions with win-win and loss-loss possibilities. Nash pointed out that every two-person game 
has such solutions. 
 
Later, the American mathematicians Merrill M. Flood and Melvin Dresher (Surhone, Timpledon, & 
Marseken, 2010) developed the game theory basis of the prisoner's dilemmas for cooperation and 
conflict. The prison sentence's interpretation and, therefore, the name gave the game Albert W. 
Tucker (Surhone et al., 2010). Thus, Albert W. Tucker laid the foundation for the growth of non-
cooperative game theory. Nevertheless, game theory splits into two main directions, the cooperative 
and the non-cooperative game theory. In particular, there is a duality between non-cooperative and 
cooperative game theory. So far, non-cooperative game theory has had more influence and is 
considered more successful. The five men who were awarded the Nobel Prize in economics for their 




Nevertheless, the cooperative game theory literature is extensive and essential and has critical 
applications in business and other fields. Cooperative game theory is always applicable when the 
Players of a game can form coalitions. These coalitions' goal is to choose a common strategy to 
improve the coalition's payoffs (McCain, 2008). Recently, the study of cooperative games has 
attracted significant interest, focused mainly on the emergence of cooperation. A well-studied 
framework for this problem is the above-mentioned prisoner's dilemma game. In this study, a 
complete picture of the behavior of another important social dilemma, the SHG, in which the 
cooperative behavior grows according to the frame it is played. For these games, two selection 
criteria, a risk dominance criterion, and a payoff dominance criterion, have been used to explain 
SHGs' results since they were introduced by Harsanyi and Selten (1988). Schmidt, Shupp, Walker, 
and Ostrom (2003) point out that changes in the risk dominance parameter affect the Player's choice. 
However, changes in the payoff dominance parameter show no significant differences. Schmidt's at 
al. (2003) results may apply to relatively small changes in the payoff dominance parameter. Still, the 
frame's effect on which the otherwise identical game takes place has not been investigated. Therefore, 
this study aims to further examine the social framing effect on the SHGs', TG, UG, and DG. In 
addition, the risk preference elicitation methods MPL and BRET are used to investigate the individual 
risk preferences of the participants and compare these with the cooperative behavior in the previous 
exanimated economic games. 
 
As we have seen, cooperation is a widely explored topic in business administration and economics. 
However, there is a gap between psychological, business administration, and economic literature. 
While there are some similarities, there is still disagreement in many respects. For example, three 
different framing effects are considered in psychology. In contrast, business administration and 
economics only mostly accept two of these effects. The previously minor considered frame in 
business administration and economics is of increased interest for the master’s thesis. The master's 
thesis investigates whether it generally makes a difference in which frame decisions are made in favor 
of or against cooperation. Are individuals influenced by the frame in their decision, or do the framing 
conditions play a subordinate role? The frameset by the scenario as mentioned earlier will provide 
information about this (see Appendix A). However, the investigation goes one step further by 
examining whether the frame plays a decisive role and the degree of risk that the willingness to 
cooperate entails. First of all, a distinction is made between which types of framing conditions are 




The first effect deals with a specific class of games, which is coordination games. In coordination 
games, several Players decide at the same time. The Prisoner's Dilemma, for example, is none of 
these games as making the same or different decisions will not result in the highest payoffs for all 
Players. Matching Pennies is a coordination game, but there are no conflicts of interest in this 
coordination game as it is in the case of prisoner's dilemma. The second effect focuses on the valence 
displayed. Valence framing refers to a class of situations in which the same information is presented 
as either losses or gains. The third effect deals with the provision of differently worded but logically 
equivalent descriptions of otherwise unchanged games. This effect has recently been hotly debated 
(Ellingsen, Johannesson, Mollerstrom, & Munkhammar, 2012; Levitt & List, 2007). For example, for 
non-cooperative games, where Players can decide independently and no third party can force 
cooperation, this type of framing can affect either the competitive nature of the situation or the 
possible group advantage of cooperation (Gerlach & Jaeger, 2016). The third effect is the focus of 
this study. It shows the difference between providing a generally formulated but logical description 
of the economic games versus a description of the games in a scenario that was formulated as a 
potential JV. Moreover, it is not uncommon for formalities to be incompatible. Mathematical models 
that describe individuals' behavior are often formally identical but still only more or less accepted by 
the neighboring disciplines. Therefore, this study mainly revolves around content-related and 
theoretical questions about the nature, characteristics, and behaviors of the context or their correlates.  
 
Considerations of rationality also play an essential role in cooperation, equilibrium selection 
(Harsanyi, 1995) and Social Contract Theory literature (Davoust & Rovatsos, 2020). Therefore, it is 
all about investigating the deviation of real behavior from the homo economicus paradigm. K. G. 
Binmore (1994) argued that not only is the homo economicus paradigm compatible with a human 
capacity for sympathy and engagement, but it is also not difficult to see why evolutionary forces 
could lead them to be part of his repertoire.  
 
Referring to the views of Bernoulli (1954/Original publication 1738) who was the first to describe 
the expected utility hypothesis, which is based on the homo economicus assumption only maximizing 
utility. The expected utility hypothesis provides an adequate solution concept for many problems, but 
not for any problem. In some cases, it is a bounded one. For example, the expected utility hypothesis 
is proposed as a solution to the St. Petersburg Paradox. The paradox can be resolved when decision-
makers demonstrate risk aversion. The first application of the theory was that of Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944). They used this assumption in their formulation of game theory. Hence, the 
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expected utility as a descriptive model for risk decisions has been replaced by more complex variants. 
By contrast, bounded rationality represents a concept that individuals' rationality is limited by the 
available information and time when making decisions. This restricts the cognitive properties. The 
idea was suggested by Simon (1955) as an alternative basis for mathematical modeling of decision 
making as used in economics and related disciplines (Kahneman, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
The concept complements rationality as optimization, which views decision-making as an entirely 
rational process to find an optimal choice given the information and time available (Gigerenzer & 
Selten, 2002; Selten, 1990). As a result, Kahneman (2003) also suggested bounded rationality as a 
model to overcome the limits of homo economicus in economic literature. Here, prospect theory 
should be mentioned, which considers irrational deviations from the expected utility model (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1979, 1992). 
 
Bounded rationality differs in that since decision-makers do not have the ability and resources to 
arrive at an optimal solution, they do not apply their rationality until they have greatly simplified the 
choices available. Therefore, a decision-maker is a satisfactory one looking for an adequate rather 
than an optimal solution. Individuals with limited cognitive resources can thus be successful by taking 
advantage of existing structures and regularities in the environment to make a decision (Gigerenzer 
& Selten, 2002). Gerd Gigerenzer, who, along with Kahneman, is considered to be one of the most 
influential researchers in heuristics, argues that Simon's ideas were not followed by most scientists 
who have dealt with bounded rationality. The focus was more on how human decisions can be made 
sub-optimally due to human rationality limitations or how optimization models can be created. 
Gigerenzer advocates simple alternatives to a full rationality analysis as a decision-making 
mechanism. Gigerenzer's research has shown that such simple heuristics often lead to better decisions 
than the classic models (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002). 
 
Thematically, the previous conclusions on cooperation must be brought into connection with 
empathy, trust, fairness, reciprocity, and greed. For this, the boundary conditions for the development 
and maintenance of gaming behavior are examined. The puzzle of cooperation among unrelated 
people is not yet fully resolved. Cooperation, which can be described as formal or informal social 
contracts, involves risks. However, before the risk of interpersonal cooperation comes the individual 
risk preference. That the individual risk preference is different in a social context and that decisions 
are made differently than when only consequences for one's own decisions are to be expected is 
another point investigated in this study. 
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Further, fairness considerations, comparisons of self-interest and other interests are potent motivators 
in social interactions. Behavioral research has shown that individuals are not purely rational beings 
who aim to maximize self-gain and care about their relative advantages over others. One way to 
examine fairness considerations in asset sharing is to have individuals play economic exchange games 
like the UG. The UG is a common scenario in which an applicant offers to split the money between 
themselves and another Player. Suppose the recipient accepts both wins. If he/she does not accept, no 
person gets anything. Recipients typically decline offers of 20% of the total around half the time, and 
rejection rates increase as the recipient proportions decrease. Thus, the rejection rates in the UG 
reflect the recipient's considerations as to which offer is fair and unfair. Given that rejecting an unfair 
offer means punishing selfish claimants at personal expense, some researchers also alternately 
describe rejection as altruistic punishment (J. Henrich et al., 2006) or costly punishment (Güth, 
Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). A social factor that seems to influence such fairness 
considerations is the group membership of the interaction partners (Y. Wang et al., 2017). 
Cooperation’s represent a group with the same or similar interests. 
 
Empathy, in everyday speech, is understood as sensitivity for others. Therefore, the relevant literature 
typically distinguishes between cognitive and affective empathy rather than looking at it as a unified 
concept (Batson, 2011; T. Singer, 2006). T. Singer and Lamm (2009) define cognitive empathy as 
the ability to understand the emotions and arguments of others without being emotionally involved. 
M. L. Hoffman (1982), who received attention in the field of psychology, argued that affective 
empathy is a disposition that promotes altruistic behavior. It has been established that a large part of 
the work on social skills and cooperation is related. Both the ability to take on affective roles and 
empathy are sometimes considered to develop interpersonal skills in social interactions (Marsh, 
Serafica, & Barenboim, 1981). Besides, many researchers see pro-social and cooperative behavior as 
lying on the same continuum or within the same general behavioral domain. Therefore, assume that 
the same processes that mediate pro-social behavior play a role in cooperative behavior (Levine & 
Hoffman, 1975). Cooperative behaviors have traditionally been defined as consequences for the self 
rather than the other, coordinating one person's behavior to achieve one's goal. It is clear that, by 
definition, there is a difference between cooperative and altruistic behavior in terms of motive. 
However, in the broadest sense, pro-social behavior could include cooperative behavior to improve 
the other's outcomes and one's own (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). For this reason, empathy is an integral 




Greed, respectively, generosity is measured in a Dictator Game. The social component of giving 
something is reflected in the DG like in no other economical game. For instance, previous studies 
have shown that people are not exclusively self-interested (Batson, 2011). Fairness and reciprocity 
must not be forgotten, as these are the cornerstones for the development and success of fruitful 
cooperation. Here, the ultimatum game is used in the course of this investigation. Giving plays a 
decisive role here, but in the UG, even the question of trust is of importance. Suppose the trust placed 
is not abused and something is returned to the trustor. In that case, the question arises about which 
extend the amount will be returned. When there is reciprocity, and when it is fair, it is crucial to look 
at willingness to cooperate from a broader perspective. 
 
Above all, decision-making under risk and uncertainty has yet to be mentioned to attest completeness, 
especially when it comes to cooperative behavior; there still exists a research gap. For many decades’ 
researchers have been addressing the thrilling question of how people make decisions under risk and 
uncertainty. However, the question of how people foster trust in cooperation is still unanswered. Till 
now, numerous studies have demonstrated that human decision-making behavior is characterized by 
multiple decision paradoxes or judgmental distortions, which are deviations from the actual practice 
of rational or normative models (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Stanovich & West, 1998). Despite the 
long history of research, the reasons for this discrepancy between actual and normative decision-
making behavior are still hotly debated (Baron & Pfeffer, 1994; Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1996) and needs further investigation. 
  
Once again, people have always lived-in unsafe conditions; they are still facing risks. Especially when 
it comes to cooperation, there is a high risk, so pro-social behavior is essential to avoid abuse of the 
trust placed in the cooperation partner. How to deal with uncertainties and how to minimize or even 
avoid risks depends on various circumstances. Therefore, the master's thesis seeks to predict 
uncertainties and risks on this issue, as researchers have not grasped this yet (Lee, Song, Kim, & 
Chae, 2019). Particularly in the confrontation of unknown risks, the attempt to perceive uncertainty 
as a predictable and cumulative risk was hardly possible (Bonß, 2013). Initially, extensive studies 
deal with the topic per se and examine the root and therefore provided the perfect starting point for 
this fundamental literature review. Finally, the continuation of existing studies on pro-social behavior 
related to cooperation generates further insides contributing to this research topic. Since these 
research areas have not yet been integrated, this contribution, in addition to the actual research results, 
will yield another piece of the puzzle to partial contribution to the overall picture. 
 
 18 
In this study, the focus is on cooperation in a general setting and a business setting. Namely, the 
problem of optimization parameters is investigated. With these problems, it can be challenging to 
coordinate whether cooperation is promising or not. Coordination problems can arise, and Players 
can be tempted to opt for an individual profit and reject an uncertain higher profit. Often Players are 
on the verge of the core problem, making cooperation unacceptable for some Players. Typically, the 
character of duality can exist, and the core of specific assignments can only be reduced to one point 
and therefore rejected. However, when an individual wants to enter into cooperation, it is generally 
not easy to accept it without prior consultation if it is not part of the game's core. The verification 
through a high computational effort is also not a plausible option for practitioners who move outside 
the theoretical field.  
 
For that, to specify and provide a detailed direction for the master's thesis, research objectives and 
limitations have been established. These objectives assist in delivering steps to be taken to answer 
the research questions. Besides, they provide clarity for the reader to understand the underlying topic 
of the thesis. The background and development have been presented to identify the research gap and 
define the further need for research.  
 
The topic's importance is seen in society's increasing desire for sustainable business and the resulting 
ever-growing interest of science in providing answers to how this can be achieved and what factors 
play a crucial role. Pro-social behavior is increasingly perceived by the annual growth in the number 
of start-ups of non-profit companies. Still, socially responsible companies reflect the desire for a life 
that benefits not individuals. The positive behavior of single individuals shows that clearly. There is 
no doubt that the number of bad examples still dominates. However, it is of overriding interest what 
constitutes pro-social behavior and how this can be guaranteed. It is essential to know and name the 
individual factors to counteract the moral and ethical decay of society in the future. There is a need 
for strategies that can be seen as a tool to make the world of tomorrow a little better for all of us and 
not just for an elite of managers, politicians, and selected part of society. The building of morality 
and ethics that strengthens the world and people against greed, recklessness, and lack of scruples is 
long overdue. There must be instance and reliable networks to prevent the world from being 
squandered and abused (Hildebrand, 1951). For this, the benefactor and its positive-acting 
characteristics must be screened and evaluated to explain this role model fact. Therefore, this is not 
an easy task and has to be a long-term and permanent topic for all those responsible in politics, 
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business, and society. It is a cumulative process of action that involves much more than traditional 
approaches. 
 
Given the above, this research aims to assess the degree of risk and uncertainty of a sample regarding 
cooperation behavior and determine how the perceptions could be related to the individual. Based on 
the research goals and literature review, the following research questions were developed to guide 
the investigation. The research questions asked: 
 
Research question 1:  
Is there a quantifiable, measurable way to show that individuals foster trust in cooperation? 
 
Research question 2:  
What impact does the individual risk attitude have on cooperation? 
 
Research question 3:  
Is there a significant relationship between the social framing effect and economic games in the 
classical representation? 
 
Research question 4:  
Which practical implications result from the empirical findings on cooperation? 
 
As we have seen, the breakdown of the individual traits that cause a pro-social behavior is not an easy 
task. It cannot be archived in one step by a single investigation. While essential have been investigated 
and published by numerous well-known scientists, further efforts must be done to gain a complete 
picture of pro-social behavior. Therefore, exposing the influence of risk and uncertainty on 
cooperative behavior is a further contribution to this important topic. What is more, it is of particular 
interest to firms because the knowledge of the risks and uncertainties firms a faced with protects the 
investments regardless of whether it is a monetary or another resource. Businesses need to understand 
the different causes and effects of the risks and uncertainties faced to succeed in the marketplace. 
Here, through the effective implementation of such knowledge, strategies could be developed that 




Above all, the master's thesis does not focus on previous approaches, such as motivation for altruistic 
action or empathy. Instead, the master's thesis attempts to explicitly demonstrate the effects of risk 
and uncertainty on pro-social behavior related to cooperation rather than shed light on selfless 
altruism, altruistic heroism, or unconditional altruism. For proceeding and more in-depth 
understanding of pro-social behavior, an experiment of the role of risk and uncertainty turns out to 




3 Theoretical setting 
The research in this study is focused on both game theory and risk assessment. This chapter introduces 
the concepts that are used in later chapters and the results of previous research. Game theory is 
discussed first, followed by an introduction to risk assessment and other important fundamental 
concepts that underpin this study's research. 
 
 
3.1 Game theory 
Game theory is a mathematical method for decision-making and strategy under differing conditions 
of uncertainty. Games are defined as strategic interactions between individuals, groups, or 
institutions, with a design referring to a complete concept of action that lists all potential game options 
and the player's resulting outcomes (Salkind, 2010). Hence, a player's strategic plan of action needs 
to consider the expectations of others' actions. The formally predicted strategy for solving a game is 
not necessarily to maximize utility. The players often opt for solutions that do not provide for a pure 
maximization of utility but are assigned to social preferences (Carpenter, 2016). 
 
Game theory, among other things, is part of applied mathematics and has many useful applications 
in practice. For example, studying political science elections, negotiation in diplomacy, evolutionary 
game theory in biology, or multi-agent systems in computer science, are among the disciplines that 
game theory deals with. However, the main application of game theory can be found in economics. 
The economic phenomena such as oligopolies, auctions, and general equilibrium are mainly analyzed 
using game theory. Economists prefer to use game theory perspectives based on strict payoff matrices 
and real monetary income to understand concepts such as altruism, e.g., ultimatum game (Güth et al., 
1982) generosity, e.g., dictator game (C. Camerer & Thaler, 1995), trust, e.g., trust game (Berg et al., 
1995) and coordination, e.g., stag-hunt game (Fang, Kimbrough, Pace, Valluri, & Zheng, 2002). 
 
 
3.1.1 Stag-hunt Game 
"If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithfully at his post; 
but if a hare happened to pass within reach of one of them, we cannot doubt that he would have gone 
off in pursuit of it without scruple and, having caught his prey, he would have cared very little about 
having caused his companions to lose theirs."  
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                                                                                (Rousseau, 1984/Original publication 1754) 
 
Skyrms (2001) names the origin and structure of the stag-hunt game and the name from the above 
story. In 1754 Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Rousseau, 1984/Original publication 1754) described the hunt 
for a stag in his Book Discourse on inequality. Skyrms (2001) shows further examples of the SHG in 
philosophical works such as A treatise on human nature by David Hume (Hume & Macnabb, 1738). 
Two men are pulling at the oars of a boat. Araujo and Leoneti (2018) consulted the oil and gas 
industry to create a vivid business example for the SHG. The oil and gas industry is awe-inspiring 
because of its dynamic business environment, which benefits from corporate partnerships and JV's. 
Simultaneously, the gas and oil industry must adhere to strict government regulations that are justified 
in its existence. A significant role is to understand and handle these actors' interests to resolve 
potential conflicts (Willigers, Bratvold, & Hausken, 2009; Zhu & Singh, 2016). Oliveira, Nunes, 
Blajberg, and Hamacher (2016) have shown that the oil and gas industry is characterized by a 
competitive environment with many current challenges such as price volatility, environmental 
protection, and partnership between large and medium-sized companies. 
 
Furthermore, the industry is also characterized by enormous investment requirements, typically 
implemented through partnerships and JV´s to share costs and risks (Castillo & Dorao, 2013). The 
main goal of alliances and JV's between oil and gas companies is to share risks, maximize investment 
portfolios and optimize short and long-term strategies. Consequently, the process of partnering up for 
the right portfolio is a critical factor for the oil and gas industry. Not only is the horizontal allocation 
of resources a potential source of conflict, but also between partnerships that vertically integrate the 
oil and gas industry. Their suppliers pose an enormous challenge to share their particular risks and 
costs (Araujo & Leoneti, 2018). The presence of these numerous agents and each strategy's effect on 
the bottom line makes the oil and gas industry an exciting and illustrative field for game theory 
applications. Nevertheless, in this study, it is not essential to have a single industry as an example. 
Therefore, the above example is only exemplary. 
 
The SHG is considered one of the most important games in game theory, alongside the prisoner's 
dilemma, when it comes to the features and dilemmas of social contracts. The dilemma between 
making a safe choice and a risky choice can found in both business and real life. In particular, many 
dynamic corporate interactions have qualities that are similar to the SHG. For example, in JV's, two 
different companies have to learn to coexist and achieve predefined goals like in the mentioned 
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example above. While there is a shared interest in making the venture payoff, there is also a conflict 
of interest when Players have an incentive to evade responsibility. In contrast to the self-centered 
prisoner's dilemma's egoistic character, the SHG is more in keeping with the diverse business 
decisions. Significant similarities are reflected in the SHG. These can prove to be potentially fruitful 
applications of this research. 
 
The game theory encompasses a large number of different types of games. For this master's thesis, it 
is necessary to classify the specific characteristics of the SHG. Games that two Players play are 
considered in this work. Each Player has two pure strategies. Only games without communication are 
considered. The SHG payoffs' character is not constant sum games where each player has complete 
information about the game. Only one-shot games and first rounds of randomly matching games are 
considered. Schmidt et al. (2003) found no significant differences between one-shot games and first 
rounds of a random match. The claim by Schmidt et al. (2003) is supported by Gallice (2007), which 
was established first years earlier by Guyer and Rapoport (1972). It is argued that random match 
games are similar to one-shot games. Players cannot strategize on the next games as they face other 
players each period. Besides, players cannot experience the learning effect as only the first rounds 
are taken into account. The general structure of the SHG is shown in normal form in Figure 1. 
 








Figure 1: General structure of the Stag-hunt Game. 
 
As mentioned above, the general elements of a game, in this case, are two players (player 1 and player 
2). There are two pure strategies available for each player in their action set. U and V depict the pure 
strategies for player 1 in their action set A1. The pure strategies L and R in action set A2 represents 
the possibilities that player 2 has. The payoff function, characterized by lower- and upper-case letters, 
represents the game's final elements. The payoffs for player 1 are represented by the capital letters A, 
B, C, and D. The lower-case letters a, b, c, and d are the possible payoffs of player 2. The intersection 
of the respective selection of players determines the payoffs.  
 
 L R 
U A, a B, c 
V C, b D, d 
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For example, if player 1 is playing U and player 2 is playing R, the intersection of player choices is 
the top right matrix with payoff B for player 1 and payoff c for layer 2. The SHG is specified as A> 
C, D> B, D> A, and B ≥ A. Although some games do not meet the specific requirements of B ≥ A, 
they are still called SHG´s. The requirement for B ≥ A relates to the story of the hunt for a stag, as 
represented in Figure 1 by V and R. When hunting a hare, as shown in Figure 1 by the options U and 
L, the same effort is expended when another player is hunting the Stag than in a situation in which 
another player is also hunting the hare it is safer to hunt the hare when the other player is chasing the 
stag. Therefore, the payoffs in the SHG should satisfy B ≥ A. The above structural statements apply 
to lower case letters and upper-case letters since the SHG is symmetric. 
 
For player 1 is the best response to play U (V) if player 2 is playing L (R) as the payoff A (D) is 
higher than C (B). Player 2 has the same payoffs in the lower cases. There are neither strict nor weak 
dominant strategies in the SHG. Both players have the same mutual best answers to each other's 
decisions. Hence, there are two Nash equilibria in pure strategies. The first Nash equilibrium in pure 
strategies is {U; L}, and the second is {V; R}. According to the Nash equilibrium definition, neither 
player has an incentive to deviate from their best answer. It holds because A > C and a> c for the first 
equilibrium {U; L} and D > B and d > b for the second equilibrium {V; R}. There are two Nash 
equilibria in the SHG that have different payoffs. Thus, the equilibria can be defined as Pareto rank-
able equilibria. The equilibrium {V; R} is the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium since its payoffs D 
for player 1 and d for player 2 are higher than the payoffs A and a from the equilibrium {U; L}. The 
inferior Nash equilibrium {U; L} is the risk-dominating Nash equilibrium. However, the list of Nash 
equilibria is not complete as there is a remaining equilibrium. It is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. 
To maximize one's expected payoff in mixed strategies, one should play their strategies with such 
probabilities that the other players' expected payoffs are the same regardless of their choice. 
Therefore, the other player is indifferent between their decisions. In other words, if player 2, taking 
into account the general structure of the SHG, wishes to make player 1 indifferent between their 
choices U and V, player 2 must assign probabilities p and 1 - p to their decisions L and R to do so. 
 
There is no consensus on whether players follow the criterion of payoff dominance or risk dominance. 
Both criteria were introduced in A general theory of equilibrium selection in games (Harsanyi & 
Selten, 1988). Harsanyi and Selten (1988), Schelling (1958), and Anderlini (1999) assume that the 
player behaves according to the payoff dominance criterion and chooses the Pareto-dominant 
strategy. In contrast, Carlsson and Van Damme (1993), Harsanyi (1995), and Van Huyck, Battalio, 
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and Beil (1990) prefer the criterion of risk dominance. Although no conclusion has yet been drawn, 
there is a broad consensus that a criterion of risk dominance is more important in predicting outcomes 
(Gallice, 2006). The prevalence of risk-dominating salience is supported by experimental evidence 
(Straub, 1995; Van Huyck et al., 1990), in which the subjects chose risk-dominant strategies more 
often than payoff-dominant strategies. 
 
Keser and Vogt (2000) conducted an experiment in which the payoff dominant strategy and the 
game's risk dominant strategy were identical. Strictly speaking, both selection criteria recommended 
the same strategy. However, more than 40% of the subjects chose a predominated strategy by both 
the payoff dominant and the risk dominant of another strategy. It appears that the test subjects did not 
make their decisions based solely on the given selection criteria. Therefore, it can be stated that 
parameters contain essential information about the magnitude of a particular selection criterion.  
 
Schmidt et al. (2003) introduced the payoff dominance parameter P as an efficiency loss 
measurement. Parameter P measures the percentage efficiency loss incurred by successful 
coordination on the inferior equilibrium compared to successful coordination on the payoff dominant 
equilibrium. More in detail, Schmidt et al. (2003) examined P and R parameters' predicted power. 
Figure 2 shows the four different SHG´s suggested by Schmidt et al. (2003). The authors argue that 
the differences in decisions between games G2 and G3 and the differences between games G1 and 
G4 are entirely due to the changes in parameter R since parameter P is kept constant. 
 
Similarly, the decision differences between games G2 and G4 and between games G1 and G3 are 
attributed to the changes in parameter P while R is held constant. Schmidt et al. (2003) conducted 
their experiments in three different settings: one-shot games, repeated games with random matches, 
and repeated games with a fixed match. In the authors' conclusion, changing the parameter R led to a 
change in Player decisions by about 19%, which according to Schmidt et al., represents a significant 
difference. However, the results of Schmidt et al. (2003) are not in line with the experimental evidence 
from Battalio et al. (2001). 
 
Battalio et al. (2001) experimented on three different repeated SHG´s with random matching (see 
Figure 3). Battallio et al. (2001) examined the influence of the optimization parameter on the players' 
decisions. The results of Battalio et al. (2001) agree with the hypotheses they made about the 
optimization premium, but they did not consider parameter P in their experiment. According to the 
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conclusions of Schmidt et al. (2003), there is no significant difference between the games as 
parameter R is kept constant. There could not show a significant difference between the R and 0.6R 
games. 
 






































Figure 2: Stag-hunt Games Schmidt et al. (2003). 
 
Still, there was a significant difference between games 2R and R. Furthermore, the difference between 
games 2R and 0.6R was not significant. Still, there is a trend that as the parameter P increases, players 
 A B 
A 60, 60 60, 20 
B 20, 60 100, 100 
 A B 
A 80, 80 80, 20 
B 20, 80 100, 100 
 A B 
A 80, 80 80, 60 
B 60, 80 100, 100 
 A B 
A 60, 60 80, 0 
B 0, 80 100, 100 
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tend to play more payoff-dominant strategies. It appears that the players may not respond to small 
changes in parameter P. 
 


























Figure 3: Stag-hunt Games Battalio, Samuelson, and Van Huyck (2001). 
 
Again, Dubois, Willinger, and Van Nguyen (2012) do not agree with (Battalio et al., 2001) 
conclusions on the optimization premium. Therefore, Dubois et al. (2012) presented an experiment 
with three repeated SHG´s with random matching (see Figure 4) in which either the parameter RR or 
the parameter OP was changed. However, the results of Dubois et al. (2012) might explain the use of 
parameter P. Considering the first rounds of games, there is a noticeable trend in results that with an 
increase in parameter P, players are more likely to choose the payoff dominant strategies. Even though 
there is a trend in players' choices between Games 2 and 3, the difference between them is not 
significant. It seems that players are more likely to choose payoff dominant strategies in games with 




 A B 
A 40, 40 35, 0 
B 0, 35 45, 45 
 A B 
A 20, 20 40, 0 
B 0, 40 45, 45 
 A B 
A 12, 12 42, 0 
B 0, 42 45, 45 
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Figure 4: Stag-hunt Games Dubois et al. (2012). 
 
Figure 5 shows the three different SHG´s investigated in this study, baseline, more efficient, and 
less risk. The conception from Schmidt et al. (2003) was pursued and applied to the self-developed 
games. The three games examined in this master's thesis were developed to systematically vary the 
payoff and risk dominance characteristics of the games. Measures of the dominance concepts 
should be compared with the original equilibria across all games. The differences to Schmidt et al. 












 A B 
A 12, 12 42, 0 
B 0, 42 45, 45 
 A B 
A 32, 32 37, 20 
B 20, 37 40, 40 
 A B 
A 28, 28 38, 4 
B 4, 38 44, 44 
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Figure 5: Stag-hunt Games of this investigation. 
 
Only symmetrical two-player games in which each player has two possible actions, A and B, were 
considered. The ordered pair (A, B) represents an outcome where player 1 selects A and player 2 
selects B. Function u1 gives player 1 the payoff for an outcome. For example, for the game baseline 
shown in Figure 5, u1 (A, B) is 0. All games have two strict Nash equilibria (A, A) and (B, B) and 
one Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. In addition, (B, B) is always the payoff dominant 
equilibrium.  
 
Starting from the game baseline, playing (B, B) leads to an efficiency gain in the more efficient game, 
but in the less risk game to a lower level of risk, whereby the efficiency level remains the same. 
Therefore, the loss of efficiency is measured as a percentage of the payoff dominance of the 
equilibrium (B, B). The measure is calculated as follows: 𝑃	 = 	 ["!($,$)'"!((,()]
"!($,$)
. 
For more details, see Schmidt et al. (2003). 
 
 A B 
A 40, 40 0, 30 
B 30, 0 20, 20 
 A B 
A 50, 50 0, 30 
B 30, 0 20, 20 
 A B 
A 40, 40 0, 30 
B 30, 0 10, 10 
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The exact specification of this measure for the payoff dominance is not important for the purposes of 
this study. However, the payoff dominance itself is decisive for this study. In contrast to Schmidt et 
al. (2003), u1 (B, B) is not identical in all games, but just like Schmidt et al. (2003), the value of u1 
(A, A) is always either 40 or 50. Therefore, every measure of the payoff dominance depends only on 
u1 (A, A) and u1 (B, B). On the one hand, it is evident that (B, B) = 20 has a higher payoff dominance 
than (B, B) = 10. On the other hand, (B, B) = 10 shows a lower level of risk. 
 
The risk dominance of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) is based on what the two call the tracing procedure; 
the detailed presentation of this method is beyond the scope of this study. Selten (1995) suggests a 
more straightforward measure of risk dominance used for the games in this study and the games from 
Schmidt et al. (2003). The measure is easy to calculate in contrast to the original measure. The 
weighted average log measure of the risk dominance of equilibrium (A, A) over (B, B) by Selten 
(1995) is as follows: 
 
𝑅	 = 	𝐿𝑜𝑔 (
𝑢*(𝐴, 𝐴) − 𝑢*(𝐵, 𝐴)
𝑢*(𝐵, 𝐵) − 𝑢*(𝐴, 𝐵)
0 
 
In the case R is positive, (A, A) is chosen, i.e., (A, A) risk dominant. If R is zero, the mixed strategy 
Nash equilibrium is risk dominant. If R is negative, (B, B) is risk dominant. It has to be mentioned 
that risk dominance is not a measure of risk preferences.  
 
In the following, the levels of payoff and risk dominance of the three different SHG´s will be 
presented as well as evaluated. In the baseline game the level of payoff dominance is -0.5 and the 
level of risk dominance is ln(0.5). Hence, (A,A) is the payoff dominant as well as the risk dominant 
equilibrium. In game more efficient game, the level of payoff dominance falls to -1.5 indicating that 
(A,A) is relatively more payoff dominant than (B,B) compared to the baseline game. The level of risk 
dominance in game more efficient is zero denoting that the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is risk 
dominant. This means that the alternatives A and B are played by both players with equal 
probabilities. In game less risk the level of payoff dominance further decreases to -3, whereas the 
level of risk dominance with a value of zero stays constant in comparison to game more efficient. 
Although the absolute levels of payoff dominance does not have a specific interpretation, the 
theoretical analysis of the three games show that in game less risk the Nash equilibrium (A,A) is the 
most payoff dominant, followed by the Nash equilibrium (A,A) in game more efficient and the Nash 
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equilibrium (A,A) in game baseline. In order to end up in the payoff dominant Nash equilibrium 
(A,A), which represents the Pareto superior Nash equilibrium  (the social optimal decision), 
cooperation of the two players is required. Therefore, this thesis empirically assesses the extend by 
which the players are willing to cooperate. Because of the fact that the mixed strategy Nash equilibria 
are risk dominant in game more efficient and less risk, all theoretical mixed strategy Nash equilibria 
have been calculated subsequently: 
 
Game baseline: Prob(A) = 2/3 by player 1 which is equal to the probability of player 2 for A. 
Game more efficient: Prob(A) = 1/2 by player 1 which is equal to the probability of player 2 for A. 
Game less risk: Prob(A) = 1/2 by player 1 which is equal to the probability of player 2 for A. 
 
 
3.1.2 Trust Game 
Trust is essential in almost every economic transaction, and it lowers transaction costs 
(Kanagaretnam, Mestelman, Nainar, & Shehata, 2009). Arrow (1974) found that higher investment 
and growth rates are positively associated with higher trust levels. 
 
Berg et al. (1995) developed the Trust Game. The TG is a game theory model to measure trust in 
economic decisions, also called the "Investment Game." The experimental game shows that trust is 
just as fundamental to financial transactions as self-interest. Since trust is not part of standard 
economics, the experiment further develops traditional economics’ basic assumption, which tended 
to ignore trust. One of the differences in comparison with the UG and DG is that initially, only the 
first Player (Trustor) receives a certain amount of money. The first player can send part or all of the 
money available to the anonymous second player (Trustee). The first player knows that everything 
he/she sends will be tripled by the experimenter and transferred to the second player. Then, the second 
player can decide whether to return a part, all or nothing of the now tripled money to the first player 
(Brülhart & Usunier, 2012). 
 
The classic economic assumption assumes that a rational player only considers his self-interest. 
Therefore, the first player's predicted action in the TG is that he/she chooses to send nothing. Even 
with complete set-up information about the game, the first player's option is not to send anything. 
This is the Nash equilibrium for the game. Following this, the second player assumes that he/she is 
not sending anything back (Berg et al., 1995). Nevertheless, Berg et al. (1995) showed that the 
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assumption of standard economic theory was violated. the first players sent money that averaged just 
over 5% of their original amount. Only 11% of the first players acted selfishly and did not send 
anything. The average amount sends back from the second to the first player was greater than the 
amount originally sent. Only 20% of the second players send nothing back (Berg et al., 1995). 
 
Despite the advantages of cooperation, those responsible often choose competitive strategies. This 
reduces the expected value that could be achieved through cooperation. This work examines, among 
other things, the role that trust plays in promoting cooperation. Although trust is a prerequisite for 
cooperation, a systematic study of how trust is built, sustained, and violated is examined. The goal is 
to identify those processes that foster trust and cooperation in negotiations. Traditional game theory 
analysis of trust is usually based on the standard one-shot TG, as shown in Figure 6. In the TG, the 
rational decision is not to trust. This is a sub-optimal social outcome since trusting is a strict 
improvement for both the trusted person and the trustee. From this point of view, Figure 6 shows a 
paradigmatic social dilemma in human society, in which R1, S1, P1 denote the utility of the trustor 
and R2, T2, P2 denotes the utility of the trustee (R. Y. Wang & Ng, 2015). 
 
 
Figure 6: Standard one-shot Trust Game (R. Y. Wang & Ng, 2015). 
 
 
3.1.3 Ultimatum Game 
Güth et al. (1982) developed the ultimatum game (Fang et al.). However, the origin of the game can 
be found in Stahl (1972). In the original form of the UG, a sum of money in a predetermined and 
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known amount is made available to two people without either of them having to do anything. If both 
parties agree on how the amount will be divided, it will be paid out as agreed. If no agreement is 
reached, neither of the two actors receives anything. Initially, the participants are assigned a fixed 
role as proposers or responders. The proposer then proposes a particular division of the amount of 
money, which the responder can only accept or reject. The process, i.e., offer and acceptance, is only 
carried out once and not repeated. The two parties cannot communicate with each other in any way, 
and they remain anonymous to their counterparts. 
 
Based on the classic interpretation of homo economicus, the players involved should act according 
to their interests rather than fairness considerations. Accordingly, a proposer would have to divide 
the amount of money so that the proposer keeps the largest possible share for himself, i.e., offers the 
smallest unit of the amount to be divided. Assuming that a responder is also acting completely 
rationally, a responder would have to accept the proposed division as long as the offer is not zero. 
There is no payoff if the offer is rejected (Stoetzer, Blass, Grimm, Gwosdz, & Schwarz, 2015). The 
result of the ultimatum game showed that most proposers offer between 40% and 50% of the amount. 
The given amount of the proposer is almost always accepted. If the amount is only 20% of the original 
amount, it will be rejected about half of the time. the rejection rates increase significantly if the 
amount falls to 10% or less (C. F. Camerer, 2011; Güth et al., 1982). 
 
 
3.1.4 Dictator Game 
The dictator game is based on Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986). The DG is a modification of 
the ultimatum game (Y. Wang et al., 2017). In this game, an amount is made available to two players. 
The general conditions of the UG are almost entirely adopted. The difference is that the second player 
no longer has the option to reject the proposed split. Therefore, the proposer is not dependent on the 
approval of the responder. Based on the standard doctrine of homo economicus, a proposer who 
maximizes his income should allocate the smallest possible amount in this game variant, i.e., zero 
(Stoetzer et al., 2015). 
 
The results in DG´s indicate that in the behavior of human beings and selfish motives, altruism, 
fairness, and reciprocity play a significant role (Diekmann, 2004; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Ockenfels, 
1999). In many cases, the players do not orientate themselves towards the Nash equilibrium, but the 
players deviate from rational strategies in some cases considerably (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & 
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Sefton, 1994). The extent of the deviation varies in various experimental studies (J. P. Henrich et al., 
2004). It is assumed that social norms are essential for cooperation to occur. Why these standards can 
lead to cooperation is a key topic of this study.  
 
 
3.2 Risk Preference Elicitation Methods  
 
 
3.2.1 Bomb Risk Elicitation Task 
The Bomb Risk Elicitation Task is a dynamic method for elicit risk preferences. The method 
essentially lets individuals choose between a specific payoff and continuing to play a game with a 
risky payoff. Based on the moment they stop playing the game, one can compute a risk preference 
range. The BRET lets individuals collect boxes, where the potential payoff increases with the 
collected boxes, as does the chance of collecting a bomb, resulting in no payoff (Crosetto & Filippin, 
2013). The Crosetto and Filippin (2013) showed that with a cumulative distribution of choices in the 
BRET, the test subjects were 51.3% risk-averse, 14.1% risk-neutral and 34.6% risk-seeking. 
 
In this study, a ready-to-use software module for use with oTree was used (Chen, Schonger, & 
Wickens, 2016; Holzmeister & Pfurtscheller, 2016), which allowed the BRET to be easily performed 
in numerous different variations, taking advantage of the potential and benefits of the latest web 
programming technologies on which oTree based. In a user-friendly and uncomplicated way, 
predefined and well-documented variables are specified in a separate file that gave complete control 
over various aspects of the game (Holzmeister & Pfurtscheller, 2016). 
 
 
3.2.2 Holt and Laury Price List  
Numerous methods are used to test individual risk attitudes. One of the most common methods used 
is the Holt and Laury price list. The method was introduced by Holt and Laury (2002), which will be 
referred to as MPL (Multiple Price List) in the further course of the thesis. MPL´s are incentives for 
determining risk preferences. The risk perception of the subjects is to be quantified based on their 
disclosed preferences. While Details can vary from application to application, the basic idea is simple. 
It is an ordered list of paired choices. The subjects have to choose a pair. The list is ordered so that 
one of the two choices gets better and vice versa. One gets worse and worse as you go through the 
list. There are many variations on the basic scheme: Sometimes, either one or both options is risky, 
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or one of them gets better or worse. Because of the list's ordered nature, subjects should be given the 
option to one page up select a certain point, and after that, you should choose the option on the other 
side of the list. Some experimenters force the participants to have an exact switching point; others let 
the test subjects jump back and forth on the list. 
 
The methods differ in the changing parameters. As the right-hand side options become more and more 
attractive from line to line, a subject indicates the line in which to switch from the left to the right 
option. This switching point then gives an interval for a participant´s risk preference parameter, 




To put it more simply, the aim of the MPL is to identify the decision-making situation in which the 
participant changes from left to right (c.f. Appendix A). A risk-neutral decision maker who prefers 
the left side with the higher expected value changes in situation 5. In other words, the participant 
chooses the left side in the first four decision situations and therefore has a value (number of safe 
choices) of 4. If a change takes place earlier (value <4), the participant shows risk-seeking behavior. 
If a change is made later (value> 4), risk averse behavior is present (C. A. Holt & Laury, 2002). 
 
In this study, a ready-to-use software module for use with oTree was used (Chen et al., 2016; 
Holzmeister, 2017), which allowed the MPL to be easily performed in numerous different variations, 
taking advantage of the potential and benefits of the latest web programming technologies on which 
oTree based. In a user-friendly and uncomplicated way, predefined and well-documented variables 




3.3 Definitions and Theoretical Foundations  
 
 
3.3.1 Social Contract Theory 
Social Contract Theory believes that people's moral and social obligations depend on a contract or 
agreement between them to form the society in which they live. For example, the legislation of a 
country, which defines what the government can and cannot do. Citizens agree to be ruled by the 
moral and political obligations set out in the social contract (Friend, 1995). However, the SCT is 
rightly linked to modern moral, political, and economic theory. Hobbes (1914/Original publication 
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1651) was the first to expounded and defend the SCT fully. Locke (1794) and Rousseau 
(1964/Original publication 1762) are two other authors who are well known to be proponents of this 
hugely influential theory. The SCT is one of the most dominant theories within moral, political, and 
economic theory in modern history. John Rawls gave the moral, political, and economic theory a new 
impetus. David Gauthier's analyzes have made this even more critical. More recently, game theorists 
have also developed new social contract theory approaches from different perspectives (K. G. 
Binmore, 1994; Friend, 1995; Skyrms, 2001, 2008). 
 
Contract models inform about various relationships and interactions between people, from students 
and teachers to business partners. Because of this, it would be challenging to look for the effects of 
SCT only within philosophy and culture; the political and economic value can also be attested to 
social SCT. SCT is undoubted with us for a long time and offers sufficient substance for further 
research. SCT is ideal for rethinking and optimizing the nature of both ourselves and our relationships 
with one another (K. G. Binmore, 1994). 
 
 
3.3.2 Strategy Method  
Selten (1967) provided the theoretical basis for the strategy method. The method gathers information 
about the whole spectrum of possible decisions. The strategy method is also known as "cold 
treatment" and collects information about the responder's preferences. For example, while the "hot 
treatment” of the classic UG asks a responder only to state his preference for a particular offer, the 
strategy method aims to determine preferences for the entire spectrum of possible offers. Thus, the 
method enables a deeper understanding of the cognitive processes behind decisions to be gained. 





Economic individuals or organizations, such as companies, business units, or departments, cooperate 
to achieve productivity gains through the division of labor and specialization. As a result, 




"Business is cooperation when it comes to creating a pie and competition when it comes to dividing 
it up." 
 
In general, Cooperation is understood to mean the purpose-oriented collaboration between at least 
two people or systems. The aim of this collaboration should be to increase the benefits of the parties 
involved. However, the selection process implies competition and refuses cooperation if no 
specification is possible (Martin A. Nowak, 2006).  
 
In business administration, cooperation is a voluntary grouping of companies that remain legally 
independent and only give up their economic independence in the areas affected by the cooperation. 
Business cooperation aims to be competitive or to increase competitiveness (Wöhe, 2016). Modern 
forms of society are characterized by a high degree of labor division between individuals and 
companies' specialization. The division of labor and specialization contributes significantly to 
overcoming resource scarcity through the resulting productivity gains. To satisfy their demand or that 
of customers, specialized companies have to cooperate within or between companies. In the group, 
various subsidiaries work together. Suppliers, customers, and partners regularly cooperate in the 
exchange of goods and services. Cooperation must not be misunderstood as an antipole to conflict, 
either within or between companies. For the characterization of organizational forms, both terms 
represent different structural features that can indeed be observed in parallel. In networks, for 
example, cooperation regularly coexists with conflicts (Fromen, 2013). 
 
 
3.3.4 The Duality of Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Game Theory 
The non-cooperative game theory as a branch of microeconomics puts actors' actions in the 
foreground to pursue individual goals in their environment. The non-cooperative game theory has 
actions, strategies, amounts of information, and payoffs as central concepts. The best-known solution 
concept in the non-cooperative game theory is the Nash equilibrium; this consists of a strategy for 
each Player so that each Player maximizes his expected utility considering the fellow Players' 
strategies. The non-cooperative game theory, on the other hand, is action and strategy oriented. 
Hence, the non-cooperative game theory's strategic orientation is replaced by the cooperative game 
theory's payoff orientation (Wiese, 2015). In an interview with Eric van Damme (1998), Robert 




Cooperative solution concepts differ from those in non-cooperative game theory. This is the case 
because the two types of the game make different assumptions about the nature of the game or the 
character of rational human behavior. A common interpretation is that cooperative game theory is 
applicable when enforceable agreements can be made, for example, by contract (McCain, 2008). This 
approach is not necessarily useful because making agreements is an action that cannot occur like all 
other cooperative game theory actions. Only in non-cooperative game theory can be measured, i.e., 
agreements (Wiese, 2015). The history of game theory can explain the statement that agreements are 
supposed to be made in a cooperative game. Game theory, both the non-cooperative and the 
cooperative, go back practically to Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). The fathers of game 
theory derived the so-called characteristic function from a non-cooperative game. 
 
In the practice of cooperative game theory, however, characteristic functions are usually not 
established with the aid of a non-cooperative game but directly regarding the social situation to be 
modeled. The above distinction between cooperative and non-cooperative game theory is unfortunate. 
It suggests a game theory divided into two branches. Despite the emphasized differences, non-
cooperative game theory and cooperative game theory can be mutually beneficial. 
 
 
3.3.5 Opportunities and Risks through Cooperation 
“No friendship, foresight, or cognition are necessary for cooperation.” (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981) 
 
In times of dynamic markets, the ability to continuously respond to market requirements with 
innovative goods and services and improved processes is vital for industrial and service companies. 
Management is confronted with a multitude of challenges, the solution of which is no longer sought 
only in one's own company. Entering into cooperation with other companies is seen as a promising 
option for action. 
 
Together with partner companies, value creation potentials can be developed that would be 
unattainable for the individual companies alone. In many companies, however, there is an ambivalent 
attitude towards cooperation. On the one hand, the possible chance or even the need to enter into 
cooperation in certain situations is seen. On the other hand, there are sometimes fears of too close 
relationships with other companies and the associated risks, which science and practice often show 
that these risks must be taken seriously objected to high failure rates in cooperation (Fontanari, 1996). 
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There are fears of contact, especially with the cooperation related to innovations, as one's own 
company's future success potential is in danger. 
 
 
3.4 Framing Effects 
Missing or contradicting standards for the description of games can jeopardize experimental 
reproducibility. For example, deviations in the game descriptions can mean that the participants 
interpret the task differently and make different decisions (Gerlach & Jaeger, 2016). 
 
In experimental economics, predefined scripts are usually used to describe games. These scripts are 
either read aloud or presented to the Players in written form. The descriptions often focus on the 
mathematical details of games, and non-mathematical aspects are presented in simple, abstract, and 
general language (K. Binmore, 2010; C. F. Camerer & Fehr, 2004). However, there are no explicitly 
defined standards for the language that is used for the non-mathematical aspects. For example, Players 
can be referred to as "you and the other," moves can be referred to as "A" and "B," and the game can 
be referred to as "the situation." Alternatively, labels from the areas of games (e.g., "the Player," "the 
Game"), finance (e.g., "the Buyer," "the Seller," "the Exchange"), or experimental practice (e.g.," the 
Participants") are used. Usually, Players are not informed of the purpose of the game before making 
their decisions. In fact, some experimental economics textbooks directly recommend researchers not 
to give any real references beyond the game (C. F. Camerer & Fehr, 2004; Friedman & Sunder, 1994). 
Overall, removing contexts is generally accepted (Gerlach & Jaeger, 2016) and even recommended 
research practice among economists (C. Holt, 2005). 
 
In contrast, psychologists have less strict conventions for implementing games. It is common practice 
to create descriptions. Descriptions can vary from experiment to experiment, even from session to 
session (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). However, Kahneman and Tversky argued that framing can 
significantly affect the assessment between treatment conditions and even cause preference 
inversions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1979, 1981, 1989). However, one 
notable exception is valence framing, a term that is often used synonymously with framing in 
business. The integration of valence framing into economic theories is explained in more detail in 
chapter 2.3.4.1. Framing effects in games are an empirically well-researched phenomenon (Gerlach 
& Jaeger, 2016). A theoretical explanation of the observed effects is still lacking. For this study, a 
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3.4.1 Valence Framing Effects 
Valence framing effects are often explained by prospect theory. Here it is argued that gains and losses 
are valued according to various non-linear value functions (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990; 
Knetsch, 1989). The loss function is generally steeper than the profit function, which describes that 
the same amount is weighted more heavily in a loss than in a profit. In particular, the prospect theory 
is increasingly accepted by economists. A prominent example is a work of Andreoni (1995) who 
suggested that Players associate positive externalities of their actions with a "warm-glow" and adverse 
external effects with a "cold-prickle." For example, in games for public goods, the positive give frame 
emphasizes positive external effects that result from one's contribution. In commons dilemmas, on 
the other hand, the structure emphasizes adverse external effects that result from withdrawal. Since 
these external effects are weighted according to different value functions, the given frame and the 
taking frame can lead to other selection options. For example, in common pool games, valence 
framing effects depend on several boundary conditions and not only trigger different value functions 
and choices but entire strategies (Kölle, Gächter, & Quercia, 2014). 
 
 
3.4.2 Context Framing Effects 
Theories about social preferences provide the most common explanation for cooperation. Social 
preference theories assume that Players consider their payoffs and the payoffs of their opponents 
(Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989). Social preferences are 
believed to be stable. Thereby, the Player characteristics are constant over time and context (C. 
Camerer & Thaler, 1995). Therefore, social preference theories cannot directly take into account 
context framing effects. 
 
However, theories of social preferences can indirectly consider context-framing effects when first-
order beliefs are taken into account (C. F. Camerer & Fehr, 2004). First-order beliefs are the Player's 
expectations of her partner's decisions. Defining a prisoner's dilemma as "the community game" could 
increase a conditionally cooperative Player's first-order belief in cooperation. As a result, the 
contextualization prompts the conditionally cooperative Player to choose differently without 
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changing her preferences. In this sense, first-order beliefs can fulfill themselves, and contextual 
frameworks can serve as coordination tools for Players with conditional social preferences similar to 
focal points (Schelling, 1958). In addition, context framing effects have also been observed in trust 
games (Al-Ubaydli, Houser, Nye, Paganelli, & Pan, 2013). For that, a social framing effect manifests 
when changing the description of a social dilemma (or a specific social component in this dilemma) 




4 Research methodology 
"Behavior cannot be invented in the armchair. It has to be observed." Selten (1998) 
 
This Master's thesis deals with risk as a normative outcome of cooperation arrangements. Therefore, 
cooperation among competitors is investigated in terms of a business context. Furthermore, the 




4.1 Experimental design and procedure 
oTree (Chen et al., 2016) the Python-based software for experimental economic research, was used 
for coding. The application was carried out by the experiment participants in a web browser, so 
physical presence in the laboratory was unnecessary. The experiment was carried out online in mid-
September 2020 under the auspices of ViaLab, the laboratory of the Viadrina University in Frankfurt 
(Oder). In particular, the laboratory experiment was deployed on the cloud application platform 
Heroku. A total of six sessions with 44 participants were held. The experiment was carried out in 
German. At the beginning of the experiment, the participants received instructions on the 
experiment's course and function. The original German text with a translation into English is attached 
in Appendix A. The experiment's sequence was as follows: Stag-hunt Game, Trust Game, Ultimatum 
Game, Dictator Game, MPL, BRET, and demographic questions. 
 
The experiment involved a treatment that presented the scenario of a JV. Thereby the social framing 
effect was tested. The treatment group experimented with the previous reading of the treatment. The 
control group had the same economic games and Risk preference elicitation methods as the treatment 
group, only without reading the scenario beforehand, i.e., all economic games and tests in the classic 
form. 
 
First, each of the participants played all three one-shot variants of the SHG in five consecutive rounds. 
Every participant was assigned to a different participant after each round. Besides, each participant 
received the results of the previous round after each round. At the end of each part, the participants 
saw all payoffs from the rounds. All rounds were added up according to the Player's decisions and 
taken over for the experiment's further course. The amounts won were not experimental currency 
units obtained in the SHG´s. The Players interacted with Euro amounts and were paid out at the end 
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of the experiment in Euros. Nevertheless, before the participants were paid, the TG was completed in 
the next step of the experiment.  
 
Second, the TG was a one-shot interaction, so a decision had to be made either as Player 1 or Player 
2. The respective role was assigned to the participants anonymously and randomly. Here, too, the 
participants obtained information about their payoff generated by this part of the experiment and the 
total amount of the last part and this part of the experiment. However, before the participants were 
paid, the trust game was completed in the next step of the experiment. Here, too, the participants 
obtained information about their payoff generated by this part of the experiment and the total amount 
of the last part and this part of the experiment.  
 
The third and fourth parts of the experiment consisted of the UG and DG. The UG was completed 
first. The strategy method (Selten, 1967) was used to obtain more detailed information about the 
Player's preferences. The UG was once again carried out in a one-shot interaction, with a randomized 
and anonymous pairing of the Players. After completing the UG, the DG was completed. The same 
approach as in the DG was followed, with the only difference that the strategy method was not used 
in the DG, as this does not make any sense in the DG. 
 
In the fifth and sixth parts of the experiment, the participants were given the tasks of MPL and, 
afterwards, BRET. These tasks are individual and do not require a partner so that each participant has 
done the task alone. 
 
Finally, the participants were given a demographics questionnaire. After the participants answered 
all questions, the final result was shown to the participants. The participants were able to close the 
application in the web browser they were using. 
 
 
4.2 Statistical Methodology 
Within the empirical analyses, various descriptive statistics and tests have been performed with R-
Studio. Due to the limited scope of this thesis, only the more complex tests and regression methods 




4.2.1 Statistical tests 
In order to assess the significance of mean values against certain null hypotheses H0, several one 









This test statistic basically represents a standardization of the estimated mean from a given sample 
(von Auer, 2017). Thereby, the test statistic follows a student t distribution because the variance has 
to be estimated from the given sample. In order to assess the significance of the test, one can compare 
the absolute value of the test statistic with the right-sided critical value from the student t distribution 
or one can consider the p-value. This value states the probability that the given test statistic based on 
the estimated mean from the sample has the estimated value under the null hypothesis or a higher 
value in absolute terms. Hence, if the p-value is smaller than a given significance level, the H0 can 
be rejected to the given significance level. In this case, the hypothesis which one wants to verify 
depicted in the alternative hypothesis H1 is statistically significant (von Auer, 2017). If one wants to 
compare two means from two different subsamples, a Welch two sample t-test is considered (von 










This test statistic again represents a standardization of the difference of the estimated means from two 
subsamples. In this case, it is assumed that the estimated variances of the subsamples as well as the 
sample sizes are different (von Auer, 2017). 
 
 
4.2.2 Regression analyses 
In order to quantify the effect of several explanatory variables 𝑥. on the dependent variable 𝑦., a 
multiple regression analysis is considered. The general form of the multiple regression model is given 
by: 




Therefore, the dependent variable 𝑦. is considered to be metric and at least interval scaled. The 
explanatory variables 𝑥. can be metric or dichotomous. In order to test the significance of the 
regression parameters 𝛽., one sample t-tests can be performed, and the p-values can be assessed (von 
Auer, 2017). For this, it is assumed that the Gauss-Markov assumptions hold. To be able to evaluate 
the effects of the several explanatory variables 𝑥. on a binary dependent variable 𝑦., a logistic 
regression model (logit model) is considered. The general form of the regression equation is given 
by: 
 
ℓ = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑦. = 1|𝑥*, . . . , 𝑥0) = 𝑙𝑛
𝑝
1 − 𝑝 = 𝛽/ + 𝛽* 𝑥*+. . . +𝛽0𝑥0 
 
Since the dependent variable 𝑦. is binary, zero or one, the application of a simple multiple regression 
model is insufficient since the mathematical expression would allow 𝑦. to be smaller than zero and 
bigger than one (Verbeek, 2008). Therefore, a mathematical function is applied that constrains the 
domain of 𝑦. between zero and one and is strictly monotonic increasing. The detailed evaluation of 
its functional form is beyond the scope of this thesis. The idea is to estimate the effect of the 
explanatory variables on the probability of the dependent variable to range between zero and one 
(Verbeek, 2008). The result is the above given logit model. Thereby, the dependent variable 𝑙𝑛 ,
*',
 
specifies the natural logarithm of the proportion of the probability of 𝑦. to be 1 (p) against the 
probability of 𝑦. to be 0 (1-p). This is named the log-odds (Verbeek, 2008). Due to the complexity of 
the model structure, the interpretation of the regression coefficients 𝛽. is not as straightforward as in 
a simple regression model. For simplicity, one can assume the probability of 𝑦. = 1 increases if 𝛽. >
0, stays constant if 𝛽. = 0 and decreases if 𝛽. < 0. When solving the equation for p, one can calculate 
the estimated probabilities for 𝑦. = 1, conditional on the value of the explanatory variables 𝑥. 








5.1 Results Economic Games 
In the following, the hypotheses based on the previous literature review and the resulting research 
questions are formed and assigned to the research results. The evaluation of the research results is 
one of the central parts of this study. 
 
 
5.1.1 Results Stag-hunt Game 
In the following tables 1 and 2, the results of the player’s choices for the three stage-hunt games 
within the business and the normal setting are presented. From these results, one can assume that 
cooperation occurs more often in the business than in the normal setting of the games’ 
implementation. Moreover, it seems that cooperation appears to be more often in the baseline than in 
the two other games which is in line with the theory about payoff dominance presented above. 
 
 Baseline More efficiency Less risk 
 Defect Cooperate Defect Cooperate Defect Cooperate 
Defect 0 3 0 6 0 7 
Cooperate 3 114 6 108 7 106 
Table 1: Stag-hunt Game - Business setting. 
 
 Baseline More efficiency Less risk 
 Defect Cooperate Defect Cooperate Defect Cooperate 
Defect 10 13 12 15 10 11 
Cooperate 13 44 15 38 11 48 
Table 2: Stag-hunt Game - Normal setting. 
 
So as to assess the effect of the different games, baseline, more efficiency and less risk on the 
probability for cooperation, a logit regression model is performed which is described in more detail 
theoretically in chapter 4.2. The regression outputs are in the following figures 1, 2, and 3.  
 
The results for the separate settings show negative but not significant effects of the more efficient and 
the less risk game on the probability of cooperation compared to the baseline game. When comparing 
the different settings, the results show a negative and highly significant effect of the normal setting 
on the probability of cooperation compared to the business setting. By solving the mathematical 
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function for p, the estimated probability to cooperate is approximately 96.14% in the baseline game 




Figure 7: Logistic regression 1. 
 
 





Figure 9: Logistic regression 3. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The Social Framing Effect reduces the strategic uncertainty in Stag-hunt games, and 
therefore more Players decide to play the Payoff dominant strategy. 
 
Result 1: The hypothesis was confirmed, which can be seen in figure 9. 
 
 
5.1.2 Results Trust Game 
The classic economic assumption of rational self-interest in the TG is that the first Player chooses not 
to send anything. Even if perfect information about the game mechanics is available to the first Player, 
the Player should not send anything. The same applies to the second Player, who, according to the 
forecast, should not send anything back. The Nash equilibrium for the game is precisely that 
prediction. In their experiment, Berg et al. (1995) showed that 30 out of 32 game attempts lead to a 
violation of the classic economic assumption. In 30 cases, the first Players sent an amount that 
averaged just over 50 % of their initial available amount. The results of the second players in response 
to the amount sent by the first players were more variable than those of the first players. Berg et al. 
(1995) found that the amount returned was highly dependent on the social information the scientists 
gave the second Player about the first Player. In general, the average amount returned to the second 
Player by the second was more significant than the amount initially sent. Only 20% of the second 
Players did not send anything back. In summary, it can be stated that the actual results of both the 










Figure 10: Boxplot Trust Game. 
 
The above boxplot shows the relationship between the cooperation behavior in the SHG and the 
amount offered in the trust game. It becomes clear that the amount offered is higher for participants 
who cooperate in the SHG. The mean value of this relationship is 54.55 (c.f. Appendix B). 
 
Hypothesis 2: Higher levels of trust foster cooperation behavior in Stag-hunt games. 
 




5.1.3 Results Ultimatum Game 
The main results of UG experiments are that most participants offer between 40% and 50% of the 
initial amount and that the respondents almost always accept this division. If the offer falls to 20% of 
the possible payoff, it will be rejected about half the time, and rejection rates will increase when the 
offer falls to 10% and less. As discussed by C. F. Camerer (2011), ultimatum game results are 
incredibly robust to various manipulations of natural design (e.g., repetition, stake size, level of 
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anonymity, and a variety of demographic variables). An exception to the robustness results is reported 
by E. Hoffman and Spitzer (1985). They show that offers are significantly smaller, and rejections are 
significantly rarer if the participants compete for the right to propose and earn it. One explanation is 
that this practice changes the perception of "fair" and draws attention to the importance of context in 
personal exchange settings.  
 
 
Table 4: Ultimatum Game - relative frequencies of the variable offer. 
 
 
Table 5: Ultimatum Game - relative frequencies when the offer was refused. 
 
The research results to date can also be substantiated in this study. Most of the participants offered 
between 40% and 50% of the initial amount. 4 out of 22 participants offered 40 Eurocents of the 
initial amount of 100 Eurocents. Eleven participants even made a fair distribution of 50 Eurocents. 
The relative frequencies of the variable offer are shown in Table 4. A total of only 3 trustees rejected 
the offer. One participant refused the offered amount of 40 Eurocents, and 2 other participants did 
not accept the offer of 0 Eurocents, as shown in Table 5. Furthermore, it was checked whether there 
is a difference in the decision-making pattern about the sexes. Offer-wise contrasts between men's 
and women's condition revealed significant effects for the offer by men (mean = 52,5) and women 
(mean =34,3). However, H0 hypothesis is rejected (p = 0.0154). In addition, it was checked which 
gender has rejected the offer. All 3 rejections were from women. In order to test if this difference is 
statistically significant, a two-sample t-test has been performed. Thereby, the null hypothesis (H0) 
assumes no difference between the sexes. The result, given in appendix B, shows that the H0 can be 
rejected (p = 0.0154). In addition, it was checked which gender has rejected the offer. All 3 rejections 
were from women. 
 
 
5.1.4 Results Dictator Game 
In dictator games, the dependent variable is (quasi) continuous. In this study, it is the mean that 
dictators keep for themself. In the beginning, the dictator (n = 22), "the proposer," was endowed with 
100 Eurocents. Dictators could enter any fraction between 0 and 100% of the sum available to them. 
The mean payoff was 70.68 Eurocents for dictators. 7 Participants offered 0 Eurocents and 1 
participant just 1 Eurocent. 
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Nevertheless, it can be stated that only 6 participants made a fair distribution of fifty-fifty, and just 3 
participants gave more to the opponents, "responder" than they kept for themself. The previous 
experimental results in the DG have often been cited as a conclusive refutation of the rationally selfish 
individual model (homo economicus) of economic behavior. Table 6 shows the contributions made 
by the dictators, "the proposers." In the case of this study, too, it could be established that a pure profit 
maximization, as assumed in the model of homo economicus, can be refuted. The first Player, "the 
proposer," in the dictator's role was not selfless; only 7 participants behaved according to the classic 
assumption of the economic model of homo economicus and focused exclusively on individual profit 
maximization. (Bolton, Katok, & Zwick, 1998). A histogram showing these frequencies is provided 
in appendix B.  
 
       
Table 6: Dictator game - relative frequencies of the variable payoff. 
 
 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics - Dictator Game. 
Hypotheses 3: Are there differences in individuals' contribution behavior concerning the classic 
assumption of economic research? 
 
Result 3: A one sample t-test is performed to evaluate if the true mean of the split of the dictator’s 
proposal is unequal to 50, which provides the alternative hypothesis (H1). The result, given in 
appendix B, shows that the H0 can be rejected on all common significance levels (p = .0019). 
Considering the 95 percent confidence interval, which goes from 58.56 to 82.81, suggests that the 
amount of the proposal is significantly higher than 50. This supports the classic assumption of homo 
economicus, at least partly. On average, the dictators gave 29.32 Eurocent. Once again, the dictators, 





Figure 11: One sample t-test Trust Game. 
 
In the following, to examine fundamental subject-specific behavioral differences in the game in a 
reduced approach, only the influence of the subject on the contribution of a Player is taken into 
account without testing the other personal factors. Table 8 shows the relative frequencies subject-
specific behavioral differences (Kulturwissenschaften = cultural studies; Rechtswissenschaften = law 
studies; Wirtschaftswissenschaften = economics). On average, the participants gave 29.7 Eurocent. 
There is no significant difference in comparison with students from other fields (economics students, 
t-value = 1.975, p = 0.0797; other fields, t-value = 3.78, p = 0.036).  
 
 
Table 8: Dictator game - relative frequencies by subject. 
 
Previous research has shown that economics students have a high level of self-interest. For example, 
Marwell and Ames (1981) showed that first year PhD students in economics are much more likely to 
free-ride than others. Frank, Gilovich, and Regan (1993) also came to the conclusion that economic 
students tend to be self-interested than consider others. 
 
Descriptive statistics (see Appendix B) provide a different picture. Whereas economics students gave 
29.7 Eurocents on average, students from other subjects gave 25.55 Eurocents on average. When 
testing the mean of the dictator’s proposal against the H0, stating that the dictators provide a split of 
50 Eurocents, the above given hypothesis cannot be supported. For economics students, the H0 cannot 
be rejected on a significance level of 5% (p=0.0797). Furthermore, the 95 percent confidence interval 
covers the value of 50 Eurocents which ends up in the same test decision. On the contrary, for students 
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from other subjects, H0 can be rejected on all common significance levels (p=0.0036). This is 
bolstered by the 95 percent confidence interval running from 60.01 to 88.90 meaning that the 
dictator’s proposal is significantly higher than 50 Eurocents. These findings contradict the above 
given hypothesis that economics students give less than students from other fields, but indeed, they 
indicate that the opposite is true for the given dataset. 
 
Several researchers gathered and analyzed measures of the number of years of formal schooling 
subjects. The researchers analyzed Ultimatum Game data; they find that schooling's extent does not 
account for any significant portion of the variation in offers in multivariate regression. Nevertheless, 
among the Tsimane, the extent of formal education emerges as marginally significant in multivariate 
regression. The Tsimane are an indigenous people of lowland Bolivia. More educated Tsimane offers 
less in the Ultimatum Game. However, they found no effect of formal education on public goods 
game play in the Tsimane. In a nutshell, while schooling effects may exist in a few cases, they are 
not particularly strong or consistent across games or societies (J. P. Henrich et al., 2004; Marlowe, 
2004). In the DG, therefore, it was only possible to demonstrate the tendency that students from 




5.2 Results Risk Preference Elicitation Methods  
 
 
5.2.1 Results MPL 
The MPL was not investigated in detail for reasons of proportionality. That is beyond the scope of 
this work. Nevertheless, the risk preferences of the participants were examined without reference to 
the cooperation behavior. It was found that 38 participants are risk-seeking, and only 6 participants 
are risk-averse (c.f. Appendix B). Compared to the BRET, the results obtained are nearly similar. On 
average, the participants are more risk-seeking than risk-averse. This leads to the assumption that an 
increased level of risk-seeking, generally the cooperation behavior supports, and that cooperation’s 




5.2.2 Results BRET 
The BRET tests the risk preference of individuals in a very simple experimental way. In this study, 
the BRET was used to investigate whether the participants who cooperated in the SHG were risk 
averse, risk neutral, or risk seeking. The decisions made by the participants can be seen in Figure 7.  
 
The experiment identified the decisions under uncertainty by showing that high levels of risk were 
commonly accepted and not characterized by risk aversion. In detail, 23 participants collected more 
than 50 boxes before leaving the application and thus showed a great willingness to take risks. Exactly 
50 out of 100 possible boxes were collected by only 2 participants. Only 15 participants collected 
fewer than 50 boxes and behaved in a risk-averse manner.  
 
In addition, it was examined whether there is a difference in the risk preference of the participants in 
the business setting or in the normal setting (c.f. Appendix B). On the one hand, in the normal setting, 
the participants who refused to cooperate in the SHG have a mean value of 46.89. On the other hand, 
the participants who cooperated in the SHG have a mean value of 40.93.  
 
A multiple regression analysis has been performed to evaluate if cooperation behavior, setting of the 
SHG, or the type of the SHG have an effect on the number of boxes collected. Results in appendix B 
show that only cooperation has a negative and significant effect on a 10 % significant level. 
Nevertheless, the F-statistic states that the whole model is insignificant. Hence, it is not considered 
for further research.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Participants who cooperate in the Stag-hunt game are more willing to take risks and 
collect more boxes in the BRET. 
 









6 Critical Evaluation and Conclusion  
In this study, a form of a social contract for the cooperation behavior in a business context was 
systematically modified to question the individual risk preference in economic games influence 
cooperative behavior and is therefore prosocial.  
 
Standard economic games and two risk preference elicitation methods have been contrasted to 
examine cooperation and other risks. The Stag-hunt game played a central role in this. The 
equilibrium selection, according to Harsanyi and Selten (1988) is used to test differences in the three 
variants of the SHG examined. Explicitly, a further investigation by (Schmidt et al., 2003) is used to 
examine the three variants of the SHG in this study. No significant differences in the payoff 
dominance and risk dominance are found. However, in the treatment normal setting in the game less 
risk, a positive influence on the probability of cooperation could be demonstrated. In general, a 
significant difference in treatment could be shown. There is significantly more cooperation in the 
business setting. From this, it can be concluded that the social framing effect makes a significant 
difference in economic games. The overall research question is answered; there is a significant 
relationship between the social framing effect and economic games in the classical representation. 
Derived from it for practice, a social component in cooperative activities of a business, on the 
horizontal as well as on the vertical level, represents a recommendation. 
 
Furthermore, in the BRET, it could be shown that the individual risk attitude has a positive effect on 
cooperation behavior. Individuals with a high level of willingness to take risks tend to trust 
cooperation more. In addition, it was found that economics students deviate from the classic 
assumption of being self-interested. Finally, it was possible to quantify and measure that trust in 
cooperation is required of individuals through willingness to take risks and a given social frame. 
 
The scope of the experimental design is pioneering for further research. Significant differences in the 
parameters could not be demonstrated in all economic games, so it is advisable to isolate individual 
parts and examine them more closely. For example, the relationship between trust and cooperation 
behavior in the SHG continues to offer scientists a rich field of research. In future research, the study 
of trust and cooperative behavior could be expanded by changing the settings of the experiment. 
Another game, preferably one with fewer variables than the SHG, could also be selected to conduct 
the research to see if the game itself affects the results. Of course, the size of the sample can also be 
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expanded to be able to analyze the investigated variants of the SHG´s even more precisely. A final 
recommendation is to contrast non-cooperative game theory with cooperative game theory. 
 
To conclude, this study discovered that individuals are sensitive to the frame they act. Rousseau 
(1964/Original publication 1762) sees the solution to the problems relating to a cooperative with one 
another in that he is in favor of a social contract that guarantees a socially just society. This can only 
be agreed. This fact could be broken down even further in this master’s thesis by showing how 
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Sie vertreten Ihr Unternehmen im folgenden Szenario: 
Die Firma, die Sie vertreten, ist auf innovative Technologien angewiesen, um am Markt zu bestehen. 
Ihr Unternehmen investiert deshalb beträchtliche Summen in Forschung und Entwicklung. Da die 
Kosten für Forschung und Entwicklung enorm sind und Ihr Unternehmen seit langem keine 
wirklichen Innovationen mehr entwickelt hat, haben Sie erwogen, Verhandlungen mit anderen 
Unternehmen in Ihrem Bereich aufzunehmen, um möglicherweise den Rest der Wettbewerber zu 
übertreffen. 
Sie verhandeln mit mehreren potenziellen Partnern und prüfen die Ihnen zur Verfügung stehenden 
Angebote. Ein Joint Venture kann für Sie äußerst attraktiv sein, da es Ihnen Zugang zum technischen 
Know-How des potenziellen Partners gewähren würde. Durch eine Kooperation könnte Ihr 
Unternehmen sicher sein einen Vorsprung gegenüber Ihrer Konkurrenz zu schaffen. 
Ein Joint Venture birgt jedoch auch einige Gefahren. Ohne einen Partner könnten Sie Ihren Gewinn 
steigern, aber nur minimal. Unter der Annahme, dass das Joint Venture erfolgreich zusammenarbeitet, 
würde doch der zu erwartende Gewinn erheblich höher ausfallen, als wenn Sie weiterhin versuchen, 
selbst neue Innovationen zu entwickeln und diese am Markt zu etablieren. Falls Ihr zukünftiger 
Partner jedoch nicht ernsthaft an einer Zusammenarbeit interessiert ist und nur darauf aus ist, Ihr 
Vertrauen auszunutzen, laufen Sie Gefahr, überhaupt keinen Gewinn zu erzielen. 























You represent your company in the following scenario: 
 
The company you represent relies on innovative technologies in order to survive in the market. Your 
company, therefore, invests considerable sums in research and development. Since the cost of 
research and development is enormous and your company has not been innovating in a long time, 
you have considered entering into negotiations with other companies in your field in order to 
potentially outperform the rest of the competition. 
 
You negotiate with several potential partners and check the offers available to you. A joint venture 
can be extremely attractive for you as it would give you access to the technical know-how of the 
potential partner. Through a cooperation, your company could be sure to create an edge over your 
competition. 
 
However, a joint venture also has some dangers. Without a partner, you could increase your bottom 
line, but only minimally. Assuming that the joint venture works together successfully, the expected 
profit would be considerably higher than if you continued to try to develop new innovations yourself 
and establish them on the market. However, if your prospective partner is not seriously interested in 
working together and is only looking to take advantage of your trust, you run the risk of not making 
any profit at all. 
 










Hallo und vielen Dank, dass Sie an diesem Experiment teilnehmen! 
 
Bitte schalten Sie Ihr Handy aus und beseitigen Sie alle Störfaktoren, die Ihre Konzentration 
beeinträchtigen könnten. 
 
Angesichts des Online-Setups der Untersuchung, die Sie erwartet, läuft auf jeder Entscheidungsseite 
eine Uhr rückwärts. Sie haben auf jeder Seite nur 2 Minute Zeit, sich zu entscheiden. Bitte unterlassen 
Sie es deshalb im Internet zu surfen oder eine Pause vom Computer einzulegen. Die Untersuchung 
kann nur reibungslos und erfolgreich durchgeführt werden, wenn alle Teilnehmer der Untersuchung 
von Anfang bis Ende im gegeben Zeitfenster miteinander interagieren und alle geforderten Aufgaben 
erledigt werden. 
 
Im Folgenden bitten wir Sie, einige Entscheidungen zu treffen und ein paar Fragen zu beantworten. 
Sie werden sich heute insgesamt 8 Aufgaben gegenübersehen. In den ersten 6 Aufgaben werden Sie 
mit einem anderen Teilnehmer der Studie interagieren. Sie werden in jeder Runde eines Spiels einem 
neuen Teilnehmer anonym zugeteilt. Die Identität, der Ihnen zufällig zugeordneten Person wird Ihnen 
unbekannt bleiben. Ihre Identität bleibt Ihrem Gegenüber während der ganzen Untersuchung 
ebenfalls verborgen. Einer von Ihnen wird zufällig als Firma 1 und der/die Andere als Firma 2 spielen. 
Bevor Sie eine Entscheidung treffen müssen, werden Sie erfahren, welche Rolle Sie einnehmen. 
 
Ihre Entscheidungen in den Spielen werden Ihnen Geld einbringen. Der Geldbetrag, den Sie in jeder 
Runde erhalten, hängt von Ihrer Wahl und der Wahl Ihres Mitspielers ab. Im Anschluss an jede Runde 
wird Ihnen Ihr vorläufiges Ergebnis angezeigt. Nachdem dem Sie die ersten 6 Aufgaben erledigt 
haben, folgen 2 weitere Aufgaben, die Sie alleine bearbeiten müssen. Nachdem Sie alle Aufgaben 
erledigt und die letzten Fragen beantwortet haben, wird Ihnen angezeigt, wie viel Sie insgesamt 
verdient haben. 
 
Ihre Bezahlung wird Ihnen per PayPal überwiesen. Hierfür benötigen Sie einen PayPal-Account (E-
Mail-Adresse), den Sie bitte am Ende der Studie in das dafür vorgesehene Feld eintragen. Wenn Sie 
keinen PayPal-Account besitzen, dann klicken Sie bitte Alternative anstatt PayPal und geben ein 
Pseudonym an, in dem dafür vorgesehenen Feldern. Wir werden Sie dann unter der angegeben E-
Mail-Adresse kontaktieren und Ihnen den Ablauf Ihrer Bezahlung mitteilen. Das von Ihnen gewählte 
Pseudonym dient hierbei nur, um weiterhin Ihre Anonymität zu gewährleisten. Bitte vergessen Sie 
nicht, auf Speichern zu drücken, wenn Sie sich entschieden haben, welche Zahlungsoption Sie 
bevorzugen! 
 
Auf der folgenden Seite werden Ihnen genaue Anweisungen für das erste Spiel gegeben. Jedes 
weitere Spiel wird gesonderte Anforderungen haben. Lesen Sie sich bitte jedes Mal konzentriert und 
aufmerksam jede neue Anleitung durch. Achten Sie bitte besonders auf die Auszahlungsmatrix, diese 
spiegeln Ihre möglichen Auszahlungen wider. 
 
Wenn Sie etwas nicht verstanden haben oder sonst irgendwelche Probleme haben, melden Sie sich 
bitte umgehend beim Experimentalleiter: Whats App: +49 176 708 716 70 oder Skype: 
theskyismyway. Die Kontaktdaten können Sie sich auch während der Studie anzeigen lassen, indem 
Sie links oben auf den Button mit der Aufschrift Hilfe drücken. 
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